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Doctrinal Classification and Economic 
Negligence 
JAY M. FEINMAN' 
This Article discusses the nature of doctrinal classification and some 
of the problems arising in third-party cases due to the distinction 
between contract and tort. It suggests that the cases can best be 
understood by recognizing an emerging field of law known as 
"economic negligence. " Economic negligence concerns the liability 
of a contracting party to a third person for negligent performance 
of a contract. Economic negligence cases include actions against 
attorneys, accountants, real estate brokers, manufacturers, title 
abstracters, surveyors, appraisers, design professionals, builders, 
and other professionals and businesses. Recognizing economic 
negligence as a field of law facilitates generalization across cases 
and leads to the identification of themes, arguments, principles, and 
subclassifications that improve analysis of case law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Most law review articles that address legal doctrine describe a problem 
with a rule or set of rules and suggest how the problem should be 
resolved. This Article is different. It examines a problem at a much 
more general level-that of the classification of legal doctrine. The 
doctrinal structure of contract and tort law is inadequate to deal with a 
large group of cases in which two parties have a contract, the breach or 
negligent performance of which causes economic harm to a third party. 
• Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden. 
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This Article argues that the solution to this problem is changing the 
structure through which we approach the problem, rather than focusing 
on changes in particular rules. What is needed is a new field of law: 
economic negligence. 
Part I of this Article discusses the nature of doctrinal classification. 
What do we expect doctrinal categories to do for us as lawyers, judges, 
and scholars? How are they supposed to do this? Why do they 
sometimes fail to do what they are supposed to do? This part illustrates 
the failure of doctrinal classification in contract and tort law in general 
and in some issues involving the liability of a contracting party to a third 
party in particular. Part II describes a response to this failure in the 
creation of the new field of law known as economic negligence. Part III 
concludes by explaining how the recognition of this field of law 
addresses the problems that arise from the traditional classification. 
I. DOCTRINAL CLASSIFICATION 
Classification is a sorting process. Through classification, criteria are 
used to sort objects among categories. Shrimp are classified as medium, 
large, or jumbo according to their size; beef is graded as good, choice, 
or prime according to fat marbling, color, and texture; buildings are 
described as Byzantine, Baroque, or Rococo according to their style; 
applicants are admitted to a law school, rejected, or placed on a waiting 
list according to their undergraduate records and LSAT scores. 
In law, the objects classified are the situations that present disputes 
which are potentially subject to legal resolution. The categories are 
doctrinal classes and subclasses, and the criteria for sorting are the 
essential facts of the situations. 1 A fact situation that presents a 
consensual transaction between commercial parties in which one party 
suffers pecuniary loss when the other party fails to perform its part of 
the bargain ordinarily will be classified as a contracts case. A situation 
involving the accidental infliction of personal injury between two 
strangers will be classified as a tort case. At a lower level, a contracts 
case in which there is evidence that the parties did not actually conclude 
an agreement will be classified as a formation case, while a case in 
which the parties dispute whether a performance conforms to the 
contractual requirements will be classified as an interpretation case. 
Classification is more than an attempt to bring a degree of order to a 
disorderly world. Each classification is created and implemented to 
achieve certain purposes. Shrimp is classified by size to enable 
I. On classification in law, see Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of 
Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1989). 
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purchasers to estimate how many shrimp will be in a pound; beef is 
graded by fat marbling, color, and texture to allow purchasers to 
compare price and predict palatability; buildings are described as 
belonging to schools of architecture to make explicit the similarities and 
differences in their design; prospective law students are grouped by 
academic predictors so that schools can admit students who are most 
likely to succeed academically. 
The classification of legal doctrine also serves certain purposes. The 
first purpose is instrumental--to achieve certain ends through the 
classification process. Different principles, policies, and interests 
underlie the various doctrinal categories. Cases that differ in fundamen-
tal ways should be treated under these distinct principles, policies, and 
interests. Sorting cases into doctrinal categories by identifying criteria 
is an effective and efficient way to assure that those cases are treated 
properly. 
The rules of contract law, for example, are designed to encourage 
consensual transactions, distinguish between transactions in which the 
parties have assumed responsibility and those in which they have not, 
ensure that parties adhere to minimum standards of commercial decency 
when they transact, etc. Tort doctrine, on the other hand, aims to deter 
conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons, 
compensate physically injured victims of wrongdoing or carelessness, 
distribute the losses of accidents to those parties who can best bear them, 
and so on. The criteria used to allocate cases between contract and tort 
law (for example, whether the interaction arises from a consensual 
transaction or an accident, or whether the harm suffered is solely 
pecuniary or involves personal injury) ensure that the proper policies are 
brought to bear in particular cases. 
The second purpose of doctrinal classification is analytic; in addition 
to providing a convenient means of serving policy goals, classification 
creates and maintains a rational doctrinal structure. A doctrinal structure 
that is relatively rigorous, consistent, and rational supports the law's 
claim to legitimacy.2 Contract and tort law as distinct categories 
facilitate a legal system which is relatively nonarbitrary, objective, 
principled, and just. 
2. Such a structure is also aesthetically pleasing. 
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This description of classification as a systematic activity is highly 
idealized, and many real classification systems--including doctrinal 
classification--often do not work in this way. Classification is often 
accomplished through the recognition of abstracted and idealized models 
or exemplars of the categories.3 These models or exemplars contain the 
stylized facts of a situation and the rules, principles, and policies that are 
applicable to the situation. A judge does not conclude that a dispute is 
a contracts case by a deductive process of comparing the facts of the 
particular case with a set of criteria for a contracts case; rather, the judge 
immediately recognizes the case as a contracts case, and implicit in that 
recognition is an understanding of the content and objectives of contract 
law. This paradigmatic approach to classification challenges the claim 
of a doctrinal classification scheme to objectivity and rationality, but 
doctrinal classification is beset with problems even at its most systemat-
ic. 
A. Problems with Classification 
The integrity of the classification boundary between contract law and 
tort law has been one of the great issues in private law during the past 
several decades. In the academy, the impetus for controversy was the 
publication of Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract.4 The extraordi-
nary critical reaction that the book engendered5 highlighted the 
significance of the classification issue that it raised. The debate between 
Gilmore and his critics was about doctrinal classification. In Gilmore's 
view, contract law as an independent doctrinal category rested on the 
classical bargain model. Because the classical model had declined in 
acceptance, he concluded that contract was no longer a viable, indepen-
dent discipline. Instead, it was being reabsorbed into tort law. To his 
critics, though, the development of contract law from its classical form 
to neoclassical contract law showed the continued vitality of a field that 
was fundamentally, necessarily distinct from tort. 
The issue of the classification of contract and tort has exclusively been 
confined to the academy; the courts have explored the boundary 
territory as well. Gilmore noted that products liability was the first 
3. See Feinman, supra note 1, at 696-700. 
4. GRANT GlLMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). 
5. See, e.g., Gary Milhollin, More on the Death of Contract, 24 CATH. U. L. REV. 
29 (1974) (book review); Jeffrey O'Connell, The Interlocking Death and Rebirth of 
Contract and Tort, 75 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1977); Richard E. Speidel, On the Reported 
Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1975) (book review); 
Robert W. Gordon, Book Review, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1216; Curtis Reitz, Book Review, 
123 U. PA. L. REV. 697 (1974-75). 
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major area of incursion of tort doctrines into contractual settings; 
although early efforts focused on the hybrid doctrine of implied 
warranty,6 tort law all but preempted the field with the widespread 
adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. More recently, 
a major issue has been the availability of a tort cause of action and tort 
remedies in cases involving contracts of insurance,7 employment,8 bank 
relationships with their borrowers9 and depositors, 10 and franchises, 11 
among others. Often litigated under the rubric of "bad faith," the 
possibility of tortious breach of contract even extended into ordinary 
commercial contracts. 12 Meanwhile, contracting parties' duties of 
honesty and disclosure have expanded through the tort doctrine of 
misrepresentation. 13 
The action along the boundary has not all taken the form of incursions 
by tort concepts into contract law. Both scholars14 and judges15 have 
made significant efforts to reestablish the primacy of contract and to 
limit the applicability of tort to situations in which the contracting 
process fails or is inappropriate. 
The debate about the boundary between contract and tort illustrates the 
defects from which classification schemes can suffer. Classification 
schemes can fail to achieve their instrumental and analytic objectives for 
three reasons. First, the criteria by which objects are sorted into classes 
6. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
7. The well-known California line of cases includes Communale v. Traders & 
General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 
Cal. 2d 425,426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 
3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). 
8. E.g., Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983). 
9. E.g., Quality Automotive Co. v. Signet Bank/Maryland, 775 F. Supp. 849 (D. 
Md. 1991). 
JO. E.g., First Nat'! Bank in Libby v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984). 
11. E.g., Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 720 P.2d 1148 (Mont. 1986). 
12. E.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 252, 
686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 {I 984); OCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 
(Utah 1983). 
13. E.g., Johnson v. Healy, 405 A.2d 54 (Conn. 1978); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 
317 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974). 
14. E.g., William K. Jones, Economic Losses Caused by Construction Deficiencies: 
The Competing Regimes of Contract and Tort, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1052 (1991); Gary 
T. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Example of J'Aire and of 
Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37 (1986). 
15. E.g., East River S.S. Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986); 
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 353, 254 Cal. Rptr. 21 I 
(I 988). 
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may not be strongly associated with the ultimate purposes for which the 
sorting is done. Within a considerable range, undergraduate academic 
performance is a weak predictor of success at the typical law school. 
Second, categories and the criteria used to establish them may overlap, 
making it difficult to clearly assign an object to one category or another. 
Rococo architecture is a developed, extreme form of Baroque architec-
ture, and some European cathedrals exhibit qualities of both styles so 
that they cannot properly be described as one or the other. Third, and 
contrarily, the process of classification itself encourages the accentuation 
of differences between items, creating a framing bias, rather than a more 
nuanced understanding of their nature. Sorting law school applicants 
according to their numerical credentials makes it easy to understate their 
personal qualities that may be relevant to an admissions decision; 
describing two buildings as belonging to different architectural styles 
accentuates the differences between them rather than the similarities. 
These problems arise with doctrinal classification as well. The fact 
that an insurance relationship arises from agreement places it within the 
realm of contract law, but ordinary contract principles are inadequate to 
address the expectations of the insured when the insurer rejects an 
advantageous settlement offer; instead, the tort principle of bad faith is 
imported to provide an appropriate remedy. 16 The difficulty here is the 
lack of a strong association between the criterion for classification 
(agreement) and the principle that contract law aims to further (protec-
tion of reasonable expectations). 
The overlap between categories arises frequently in contract and tort 
law. The sale of a defective product gives rise to liability for breach of 
warranty in contract and for strict product liability in tort. 17 An 
erroneous statement of intention can give rise to liability for breach of 
promise and for misrepresentation. 18 Difficulties arise in these cases 
when the characterization as either tort or contract makes a difference in 
the outcome of the case due to a different liability rule, damage formula, 
required formality (such as the Statute of Frauds), or collateral effect 
(such as a statute of limitations). 19 
Framing bias results from the overemphasis of the differences between 
doctrinal categories. In wrongful discharge cases, for instance, some 
courts take a purely contracts approach and fail to provide a remedy for 
an employee unless the court can construct an express or implied 
16. See sources cited supra note 7. 
17. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 98, 
at 694 (5th ed. I 984). 
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I 9. Id. § 92, at 664-67. 
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contract right rebutting the presumption of employment at will.20 Other 
courts create a tort remedy and focus on the wrongfulness of the 
employer's conduct, understating the terms on which the parties agreed 
to perform, including the lack of any understanding limiting the 
employer's power to discharge.21 
B. Classification Problems in Third-Party Settings 
The problems of association, overlap, and framing bias occur in 
pockets of cases involving typical two-party contractual settings. They 
arise even more frequently in situations in which the performance of a 
contract between two parties affects a third person and in situations in 
which multiple parties have contracts that contemplate interlocking 
performances. This section illustrates the difficulties by discussing two 
areas in which third-party cases arise.22 The construction process 
presents some of the most complex settings in which classification 
problems arise. Product-related economic loss, or the liability of a 
manufacturer of a product to a remote purchaser, is a much-discussed 
area of conflict between the law of contract and the law of tort. 
J. Construction 
Each participant in a construction project structures its role on the job 
through contracts with a limited number of other participants. In the 
classic form of organization, for example, the owner hires an architect 
to design the building and to supervise its construction. The owner 
contracts separately with a general contractor to build the building in 
accordance with the architect's design and under the architect's 
supervision. Much of the actual work is done by specialist subcon-
tractors who are hired by the general contractor. Each party can look to 
its contracting partner(s) for a remedy in case it suffers economic harm. 
For example, the owner could pursue the general contractor for defects 
20. Compare Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 322 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 
App. Ct. I 974) (employee entitled to damages because employer failed to follow 
procedures set forth in employment manual), with Hogge v. Champion Labs, 546 N.E.2d 
1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (manual expressly stated it did not constitute a contract or 
exclusive statement of reasons for discharge). 
21. E.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974). 
22. For other examples, see Part III, infra. 
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or delay in the work, even if a subcontractor was actually at fault, and 
the general could in tum pursue the subcontractor. In practice, however, 
an injured party's action against its contracting partner may be unattrac-
tive or unavailing.23 Therefore, the construction process often generates 
claims against third parties with whom the plaintiffs do not have a 
contract.24 
The disputes among performing parties arise when one party has been 
delayed or its work made more costly by another party's failure to 
perform properly. The largest group of these disputes involves claims 
against architects or engineers for negligent design or preparation of the 
plans and specifications or negligent supervision of the construction 
process, so this issue serves as an example of the classification problems 
in the construction area.25 
The classification problem was resolved easily under the traditional 
law because the absence of a contractual relationship between the design 
professional and a third party-the lack of contractual privity-was a 
clear bar to any form of action. Without privity, the design professional 
obviously owed no contractual duty to the third party and, under the rule 
of Winterbottom v. Wright,26 also owed no tort duty. The traditional 
rule was very durable, lasting for more than thirty years before it was 
generally rejected.27 
The two cases that were most important in removing the privity barrier 
to third party actions against design professionals and thereby confusing 
the classification issue were United States for the Use of Los Angeles 
Testing Laboratory v. Rogers & Rogers28 and A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. 
Graham. 29 In Rogers & Rogers, concrete work used in the project with 
23. For example, the contracting partner may be insolvent; the injured party may 
wish to preserve good relations with its partner; the injured party and the contracting 
partner may settle the dispute in an amount that is less than the extent of its entire loss; 
or the action against the contracting partner may be limited in amount or barred 
altogether, either by a provision in the contract or by the operation of a rule of law. 
24. Persons who ultimately benefit from the construction process often do not enter 
into contracts concerning the process itself, yet they may be injured by the inadequate 
or untimely performance of the contracting parties. By far the largest group of third-
party cases of this type involves actions by a purchaser or subsequent purchaser of 
residential property against the builder of the property or another participant in the 
construction process. There are also cases in which an owner who participates in the 
construction process sues a subcontractor, and cases in which a tenant sues the builder 
who was retained by the owner to build or renovate the leased property. 
25. Another large group of cases involves actions by co-prime contractors against 
each other. In addition, subcontractors sometimes sue each other or the owner. 
26. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). 
27. E.g., Peyronnin Constr. Co., Inc. v. Weiss, 208 N.E.2d 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1965). 
28. 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958). 
29. 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973). 
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the approval of the architect was inadequate, requiring the contractor to 
compensate for the defects. The contractor alleged that the architect 
negligently interpreted tests on the concrete, approved the work, and then 
stopped the work. The federal court noted California's then-recent 
abandonment of the privity doctrine in actions for economic loss 
resulting from negligent performance of a contractual duty in favor of 
the balance of factors test for negligence. 30 The court did not analyze 
each of the factors in detail, but it focused on a particular aspect of the 
situation as decisive: 
Considerations of reason and policy impel the conclusion that the position and 
authority of a supervising architect are such that he ought to labor under a duty 
to the prime contractor to supervise the project with due care under the 
circumstances, even though his sole contractual relationship is with the owner 
.... Altogether too much control over the contractor necessarily rests in the 
hands of the supervising architect for him not to be placed under a duty 
imposed by law to perform without negligence his functions as they affect the 
contractor. The power of the architect to stop the work alone is tantamount to 
a power of economic life or death over the contractor. It is only just that such 
authority, exercised in such a relationship, carry commensurate legal responsi-
bility.31 
After the Florida Supreme Court in Moyer adopted the rule of Rogers 
& Rogers, a definite trend emerged in favor of negligence liability in 
design professional cases.32 The Moyer court dismissed the common 
law rule that an architect is not liable to a party with whom it is not in 
privity, stating that "[p ]rivity is a theoretical device of the common law 
that recognizes limitation of liability commensurate with compensation 
for contractual acceptance of risk. The sharpness of its contours blurs 
when brought into contact with modem concepts of tort liability."33 
Following Rogers & Rogers, and especially Moyer, a number of 
jurisdictions adopted the position that a third party engaged in the 
construction process had a cause of action for negligent performance by 
an architect. Some courts used the control rationale of Rogers & Rogers 
30. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. at 135 (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 
647, 651, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958)). 
3 I. Id. at 135-36. 
32. In a recent case involving the liability of a subcontractor to purchasers of 
condominium units, the Florida Supreme Court limited Moyer "strictly to its facts." 
Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1248 
n.9 (Fla. 1993). 
33. Moyer, 285 So. 2d, at 399. 
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and Moyer. 34 Others used more general negligence analysis, applying 
the basic principle that liability attaches for foreseeable risks, 35 some-
times also emphasizing the professional status of the architect and the 
malpractice liability that attaches to that status.36 
The most significant challenge to placing design professional cases in 
the negligence category has been the application of the economic loss 
rule. In this context, the economic loss rule distinguishes purely 
pecuniary losses from losses due to personal injury or property damage 
losses as the criterion that governs the classification of cases. Economic 
losses are losses due to disappointed expectations, and should therefore 
be governed by contract law; only losses due to personal injury or 
property damage, which generally are not the subject of prior bargaining 
and which invoke public safety concerns, are within the realm of tort 
law. Accordingly, actions against design professionals for economic 
losses are barred in jurisdictions which enforce the economic loss 
rule.37 
The attitude of the courts that have refused to impose negligence 
liability in economic loss cases is summed up in Blake Construction Co. 
v. Alley:38 
34. E.g., E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Tex., 551 F.2d 1026 (5th 
Cir. 1977); Shoffner Indus. v. W.B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 257 S.E.2d 50, (N.C. Ct. App.), 
rev. denied, 259 S.E.2d 301 (N.C. 1979). Shoffner Industries is representative of those 
cases that use several rationales in support of negligence liability, including the 
architect's control over the contractor, the foreseeability ofan unreasonable risk of harm, 
and the reliance caused by the interdependence of the performing parties. 
35. E.g., Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 
1984) (contractor was foreseeable victim of foreseeable risk of architect's error); Farrell 
Constr. Co. v. Jefferson Parish, 693 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. La. 1988) (architect/engineer 
owed duty of care to contractor even though contractor was not third party beneficiary); 
Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. New Hanover County, 255 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. Ct. App.}, rev. 
denied, 259 S.E.2d 911 (N.C. 1979) (foreseeable harm yields duty of care); Calandro 
Dev't, Inc. v. R.M. Butler Constructors, Inc., 249 So. 2d 254 (La. Ct. App. 1971) 
(architect liable to contractor's surety). 
36. E.g., Donnelly Constr. Co., 677 P.2d 1292; Davidson & Jones, Inc., 255 
S.E.2d 580. 
The negligence of the design professional that results in an erroneous statement can 
form the basis of an action for negligent misrepresentation, as well as for negligent 
performance in an ordinary negligence action. In these cases, the courts typically use 
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 552 formulation of the standard for negligent 
misrepresentation as the basis for liability in appropriate cases. 
37. E.g., Sandarac Ass'n v. W.E. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1992), approved in Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino 
& Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993); Fence Rail Dev't Corp. v. Nelson & 
Associates, 528 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. 1988); 
Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 560 N.E.2d 206 
(Ohio 1990); Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724 (Va. 1987). 
38. Blake Constr. Co., 353 S.E. 2d 724. 
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The parties involved in a construction project resort to contracts and contract 
law to protect their economic expectations. Their respective rights and duties 
are defined by the various contracts they enter. Protection against economic 
losses caused by another's failure properly to perform is but one provision the 
contractor may require in striking his bargain. Any duty on the architect in this 
regard is purely a creature of contract. 39 
There follows from this analysis a general attack on the Rogers & 
Rogers and Moyer control rationale: 
So long as the contracting parties have freedom to contract as they wish, with 
respect to the architect's power and role, these will vary considerably and no 
rule of general applicability may logically be stated which is founded simply 
upon the status of the defendant as "an architect" or upon what one believes to 
be the customary relationship between the work, the architect, the owner, and 
the contractor; particularly a general rule should not be founded upon a 
presumption that the architect has power over the contractor's performance, in 
general or in any particular of the work. ' 0 
As the conflict between Rogers & Rogers and Moyer on the one hand 
and Blake Construction Co. v. Alley on the other makes clear, the 
architect liability cases embody the problems of doctrinal classification. 
When an architect improperly designs or supervises a contractor's work, 
the resulting dispute has the attributes of both a contract case (a 
relationship founded on agreement) and a tort case (negligently-inflicted 
harm). The courts are faced with a dilemma: The two doctrines that 
could apply to the case yield inconsistent results, but it is unsatisfactory 
to treat the case exclusively either in contract or in tort. The contract 
approach slights the concern for the harm that the architect's carelessness 
can inflict on the contractor, while the tort approach gives too little 
weight to the allocation of risks and benefits in the parties' agreement. 
2. Manufactured Products 
Product-related economic loss cases also present problems for the 
contract-tort boundary. Most of the cases arise from a series of sales in 
which the parties are all sequential links in a chain for the production 
and distribution of goods from manufacturer to ultimate purchaser. 
Typically, the user of a product who purchased it from an intermediate 
39. Id. at 727. 
40. Bernard Johnson, Inc. v. Continental Constructors, 630 S.W.2d 365, 371-72 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982). 
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distributor brings an action against the original manufacturer or a 
manufacturer of a component part. In many of the cases some of the 
harm takes the form of physical damage to the product or other property 
of the user, so it is necessary first to determine if the injury involves 
purely economic loss or some form of physical harm. The presence of 
an extensive statutory scheme that regulates many of the transactions in 
this area------the Uniform Commercial Code--complicates the analysis. 
Two leading New Jersey cases illustrate the classification problems in 
this area of law: Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, lnc.,41 and Spring 
Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 42 Santor v. A & M 
Karagheusian, Inc., the first major third party products case, involved a 
consumer who purchased carpet that developed unusual "lines" running 
through it. When the retail dealer from whom Santor purchased the 
carpet moved out of state, Santor contacted Karagheusian, the manufac-
turer, in a fruitless attempt to have the defect remedied. The trial court 
found that the manufacturer had breached an implied warranty of 
merchantability that existed even in the absence ofprivity. Although the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed that the warranty action would lie, 
it stated that "the manufacturer's liability may be cast in simpler form" 
under the doctrine of strict liability in tort.43 
Tracing the development of the liability of manufacturers to nonprivity 
consumers, the Santor court found no reason to distinguish between 
personal injury and economic loss in product cases. In both cases, the 
court emphasized, the manufacturer is the key actor who puts the 
product on the market and who guarantees its quality.44 Providing a 
direct action by the consumer avoids a chain of actions against 
intermediate sellers and avoids the occasional inability of the consumer 
to recover against a retailer (as would likely have happened in Santor, 
since the dealer had moved from New Jersey to Maine).45 Implied 
warranty is a legal fiction that accomplishes what strict liability 
accomplishes more directly; in both cases, the basis of the action is the 
presence of the product on the market, not any representations that 
accompany it. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court moved away from its position in 
Santor in Spring Motors Distributors Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 46 In 
41. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965). 
42. 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985). 
43. Santor, 207 A.2d at 311. 
44. Id. at 309. 
45. Id. at 307. 
46. For a complete discussion of the case, see Patricia A. Brown & Jay M. 
Feinman, Economic Loss, Commercial Practices, and Legal Process: Spring Motors 
Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 22 RUTGERS L. J. 301 (1991). 
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Spring Motors the commercial purchaser of a fleet of trucks encountered 
repeated and irremediable difficulties with the trucks' transmissions. 
The purchaser brought an action against the dealer, the manufacturer of 
the trucks, and the manufacturer of the transmissions. The purchaser 
initially pleaded breach of express and implied warranties under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, negligence, and strict liability, but it was 
forced to proceed only on the tort claims because the statute of 
limitations had run on the contract claims.47 
The Spring Motors court reformulated the approach that it had 
fashioned in Santor. The court defined a model of contract in which 
commercial parties of equal bargaining power bargained with respect to 
the risks that they could effectively bear.48 This area of bargaining is 
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code "which constitutes a 
comprehensive system for determining the rights and duties of buyers 
and sellers with respect to contracts for the sale of goods."49 Tort law 
is appropriately invoked only when the preconditions of con-
tract--comparable bargaining power and the ability to bear or distribute 
risks----do not exist.50 Personal injury to a consumer caused by a 
manufactured product is a prime example of an instance in which the 
preconditions of contract do not exist, which is why strict liability is 
imposed in that area. The court distinguished Santor without reconsider-
ing it by stating that Spring Motors involved a commercial purchaser, 
contrasted to the consumer purchaser in the earlier case. 51 Neverthe-
less, the privity barrier could be surmounted in warranty. In dictum, the 
court stated that it would allow a nonprivity purchaser to recover against 
a manufacturer of the finished item or a component part.52 However, 
that step was taken in contract law, not tort. 
Santor and Spring Motors present a sharp contrast between the tort 
and contract approaches to products cases and illustrate the problems of 
the existing classification. The problems become even more acute in 
cases in which the nature of the injury is seen as a key to determining 
the appropriate classification. In the paradigm case of a remote 
47. Spring Motors Distributors Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 664 (N.J. 
1985). 
48. Id. at 666. 
49. Id. at 665. 
50. Id. at 670. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 676-77. 
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commercial purchaser who suffers only economic loss because of the 
inadequacy of the product, the great majority of jurisdictions follow 
Spring Motors and hold that no tort action is available.53 This ap-
proach to the paradigm case presents the economic loss rule in its pure 
form: when the harm caused by a product talces only the form of 
economic loss, the injury is not compensable in tort law. Quite 
frequently, however, the defect in the product does more than simply 
diminish its value; the defect may also cause, in ascending order of 
seriousness, physical damage to the product itself, physical damage to 
other property of the purchaser, or personal injury to the purchaser or 
others. 
Personal injury caused by a defective product is always recover-
able in tort. 54 Physical damage to other property of the purchaser is 
also generally recoverable in either negligence or strict products liability 
under the theory that the interest in the security of one's physical 
property is an interest traditionally protected by tort law.55 For 
example, when an ingredient supplied to a feed manufacturer to be 
mixed into calf feed adulterates the feed, causing injury and death to the 
calves of the buyer of the feed, the ingredient manufacturer is liable only 
in contract to the feed manufacturer but is liable in tort to the owner of 
the calves.56 Cases in which the only damage that occurs is to the 
product sold itself are more controversial. There are two polar positions 
and two intermediate positions.57 
One large group of cases holds that damage to the product is simply 
a form of economic loss which is covered by the economic loss rule, so 
no tort liability is available.58 As the United States Supreme Court 
stated, "[t]he tort concern with safety is reduced when an injury is only 
to the product itself .... Such damage means simply that the product has 
53. E.g., State ex rel+. Smith v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 680 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 
1984); Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal. Rptr 113 (1972); 
GAF Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Marcil v. John Deere 
Indus. Equip. Co., 403 N.E.2d 430 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). 
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1965). 
55. E.g., Pisano v. American Leasing, 146 Cal. App. 3d, 194 Cal. Rptr.77 (1983); 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. CE! Indus. of Ill., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); 
John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 403 N.E.2d 430 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); Lloyd F. Smith 
Co. v. Den-tal-ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d l l (Minn. 1992). 
56. Starks Feed Co. v. Consolidated Badger Coop., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 1255 (N.D. 
Ill. I 984). 
57. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Strict products liability: recovery for damage 
to product alone, 72 A.LR.4th I 2. 
58. E.g., Wellcraft Marine v. Zarzour, 577 So. 2d 414 (Ala. 1990); Long v. Jim 
Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 217 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Board of Educ. of Chicago 
v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. 1989). 
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not met the consumer's expectations, or, in other words, that the 
customer has received 'insufficient product value. "'59 Accordingly, 
warranty law under the U.C.C. is the proper vehicle for defective 
product actions; warranty law gives the purchaser the benefit of its 
bargain while limiting the manufacturer's liability to foreseeable losses. 
At the other end of the spectrum, some courts have suggested that any 
injury to the product is recoverable in tort. In John R. Dudley Construc-
tion, Inc. v. Drott Manufacturing Co.,60 for example: 
[The court found] no logical reason why, under the circumstances of the 
accident as alleged, the law should allow recovery for injuries to plaintiff's 
property beyond the limits of the crane (assuming there had been some) and 
disallow damages for the parts of the crane damaged or destroyed when it 
collapsed. In either case the damages could be said to have resulted from the 
same tortious conduct by appellants in supplying a crane that was dangerously 
susceptible to collapse because of the defective bolts.61 
In between these two polar positions, other jurisdictions use two more 
complex methods to draw the line between contract and tort in cases of 
injury to the product.62 One group of cases focuses on the means by 
which the harm occurs. If the harm to the product occurs in a manner 
that could have caused personal injury or damage to other property, then 
the interests protected by tort law are implicated, even if the only injury 
that actually does occur is to the product itself. The most common 
formulations of this approach are that the harm be caused in an 
accident63 or be "sudden and calamitous.''64 
59. East River S.S. Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871-72 
(1986), (citing JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT s. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
406 (2d ed. 1980)). 
60. 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). 
61. Id. at 514. See also Spence v. Three Rivers Building & Masonry Supply, Inc., 
90 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1958); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 182 N.W.2d 800, 
807 (Mich. Ct. App. I 970). 
62. See Touchet Valley Grain Growers, Inc. v. Opp & Seibold, 831 P.2d 724, 733-
34 (Wash. 1992). 
63. Clevenger & Wright Co. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc, 625 S.W.2d 
906, 909 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981 ); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d I 383, 1384 (Or. 
1978). 
64. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977); Vulcan Materials Co. 
v. Driltech, Inc., 306 S.E.2d 253 (Ga. I 983); Capitol Fuels, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 382 
S.E.2d 311 (W. Va. 1989). But see Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar 
Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 328 (Alaska 1981) (sudden and calamitous phrase has no 
"magical quality"). 
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The rule in a second group of cases directs courts to conduct in each 
case an individualized examination of the application of tort and contract 
policies to determine the proper classification of the case. This approach 
originated in the Third Circuit opinion in Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. 
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 65 Under this rule, no simple test or formula 
can determine whether contract or tort policies are involved in a 
particular case. 
In cases such as the present one where only the defective product is 
damaged, the majority approach is to identify whether a particular injury 
amounts to economic loss or physical damage. In drawing this distinction, the 
items for which damages are sought, such as repair costs, are not detenninative. 
Rather, the line between tort and contract must be drawn by analyzing 
interrelated factors such as the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the 
manner in which the injury arose. These factors bear directly on whether the 
safety-insurance policy of tort law or the expectation-bar!l,ain protection policy 
of warranty law is most applicable to a particular claim. 
IL ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE As A NEW CLASSIFICATION 
Third-party cases involving economic loss present significant problems 
for the classification of contract and tort law. As the design professional 
and products cases demonstrate, the classification problem was not so 
acute when privity was required for a cause of action. The law was 
relatively stable, and there were very few cases brought by third parties 
and therefore very little difficulty with the law. Beginning in the 1950s 
and accelerating in the 1970s, though, courts recognized the injustice of 
the privity requirement's complete bar to a remedy in these cases and 
began to expand liability.67 The expansion of liability has made 
apparent the problems of association, overlap, and framing bias that are 
immanent in the contract-tort classification. 
These problems can be best addressed by reorganizing the doctrinal 
structure, rather than by manipulating the doctrinal content of the 
traditional structure. All these third-party economic loss cases have 
common characteristics and raise common issues. To better understand 
this expanding body of case law, it is appropriate to view the cases as 
65. 652 F.2d 1165 (3rd Cir. 1981) (applying Pa. law); see also Jame v. Bell 
Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1983); Ales-Peratis Foods Int'!, Inc., v. American 
Can Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 277,209 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1985). 
A more recent Third Circuit opinion suggested that the Pennsylvania courts would 
depart from the Pennsylvania Glass Sand rule in light of the Supreme Court's opinion 
in East River. Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1987). The 
suggestion was adopted in Rem Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 563 A.2d 128 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1989). But see Capitol Fuels, Inc., 382 S.E.2d 311 (declining to follow East River). 
66. Pennsylvania Glass Sand, 652 F.2d at 1173. 
67. See part II, infra. 
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belonging to a distinctive doctrinal category with its own themes, issues, 
and problems that is usefully conceived to be independent of both 
contract and tort, as more general fields, and of the particular factual 
categories from which the cases arise. This category is known as 
"economic negligence".68 
Economic negligence cases have four distinctive characteristics that 
render them appropriate for consolidation into a single field for purposes 
of analysis. These characteristics become the identifying criteria for 
inclusion of a case in the field. First, every economic negligence case 
arises out of a contractual setting. At a minimum, the defendant enters 
into a contract with a second party, the performance of which affects a 
third person (the plaintiff). Often, the second party solicits the 
defendant's performance in part to confer a benefit on the plaintiff. For 
example, a testator who retains an attorney to draft a will through which 
the testator wishes to devise property to a beneficiary illustrates. 
Many cases involve more complex contractual relationships. In some 
cases, the defendant and the plaintiff each have a contract with the 
second party. In others, a chain of contracts exists: a product manufac-
turer sells its goods to a retailer who in tum sells them to the ultimate 
purchaser. In still others, the separate contracts can be formed in the 
context of a single transaction. For example, a home seller contracts 
68. See generally Jay M. Feinman, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF 
PROFESSIONALS AND BUSINESSES TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC Loss ( 1995). The 
term was first used in BRUCE FELDTHUSEN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: THE RECOVERY 
OF PURE ECONOMIC Loss 8-14 (2d ed. 1988), a monograph primarily focusing on law 
in the Commonwealth. There has been considerably more literature on aspects of the 
subject in the Commonwealth than in the United States. See, e.g., Patrick S. Atiyah, 
Negligence and Economic Loss, 83 L.Q. REV. 248 (1967); PETER CANE, TORT LAW AND 
ECONOMIC INTERESTS ch. 9 (1991); THE LAW OF TORT: POLICIES AND TRENDS IN 
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC Loss (Michael Furmston ed., 
1986); J.A. Smillie, Negligence and Economic Loss, 32 U. TORONTO L. REV. 231 
(1982); Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care and Economic Loss: A Wider Agenda, 107 L.Q. 
REV. 249 (1991). 
For general discussion of issues relating to economic negligence in American law, 
see, e.g., Leon Green, The Duty to Give Accurate Ieformation, 12 UCLA L. REV. 464 
( 1965); Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by 
Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1972); Michael D. Lieder, 
Constructing a New Action for Negligent Infliction of Economic Loss: Building on 
Cardozo and Coase, 66 WASH. L. REV. 937 (1991); Walter Probert, Negligence and 
Economic Damage: The California-Florida Nexus, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 485 (1981); 
William L. Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 V AND. L. REV. 231 (1966); 
Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassess-
ment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985). 
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with a termite inspector to provide a certification that the home is free 
of infestation because the seller's contract with the buyer requires such 
a certification. In the most complex contractual settings, the defendant, 
the second party, and the plaintiff have contracts that effectively require 
interlocking performances. A subcontractor on a building project may 
formally contract only with the general contractor, but its performance 
will affect and be affected by the actions of the owner, architect, and 
other subcontractors. 
Second, the harm to the plaintiff occurs because the defendant acts 
carelessly ( or, in a nontechnical sense, negligently) with respect to some 
element of its contractual performance. The defendant's failure to 
exercise care in the performance of its contract ( e.g., drafting a will, 
designing a building, inspecting a home) causes injury to the plaintiff's 
economic interests. Frequently, the defendant's performance culminates 
in a communication upon which the plaintiff relies, and the communica-
tion is erroneous due to the defendant's failure to exercise care in 
making the investigation upon which the communication depends, as can 
be the case with an accountant's audit report, an attorney's opinion, and 
a building inspector's certificate. 
Third, these cases involve pecuniary loss, not physical injury. Under 
the traditional view, personal injury is considered to be qualitatively 
different than economic loss because it often has catastrophic conse-
quences for the victim and because monetary compensation is unable to 
wholly remedy injury of this kind.69 As noted above, some economic 
negligence cases involve property damage, which occupies a middle 
ground between purely pecuniary loss and personal injury. The defects 
in a negligently constructed building or a defective product often 
manifest themselves as physical injury to property: a cracked foundation 
or a collapsed vehicle, for instance. The defects also may cause injury 
to other property, as where tainted feed kills the animals who eat it. As 
an initial classification criterion, cases of property damage of this sort 
are enough like economic loss cases to fall within the law of economic 
negligence. 
Fourth, because the plaintiff's loss is not bounded by either physical 
causation or a direct contractual relationship with the defendant, 
economic negligence cases have the potential of creating indeterminate 
liability on the defendant. 70 The economic consequences of a negligent 
act can ripple much farther than the physical consequences, particularly 
where the negligent act is the communication of information. Driving 
69. See FELDTHUSEN, supra note 68, at 8-14. 
70. See id. at 96-125. 
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through a red light is likely to cause harm only to people who are in the 
intersection at the time; even manufacturing a defective product is likely 
to cause personal injury only to a single user of the product and perhaps 
others in proximity at the time of use. The consequences to the injured 
parties may be catastrophic, but they ordinarily do not extend to a large 
group of people or to anyone far removed from the negligent act. 
Economic harm is much less confined; many lenders or investors can 
rely on an accountant's audit report, and a purchaser of property may 
rely on a survey prepared for a prior owner years earlier. 
The threat of indeterminate liability refers both to indeterminacy of the 
number of potential plaintiffs (the potential users of the audit report) and 
to the size of their claims (the property purchaser whose loss depends on 
the increase in value of the property since the time of survey). Not all 
economic negligence cases feature these concerns to the same extent, and 
indeterminacy is involved in some physical damage cases,71 but the 
distinction is sufficient to suggest the desirability of treating economic 
negligence as a distinctive area of law. 
These four features characterize the construction cases and products 
cases described in Part I, and they also arise in many other settings. The 
following cases illustrate the range of settings that give rise to economic 
negligence cases: 
-A lender or trade creditor who advances funds to a company in 
reliance on the company's audited financial statements sues the 
accountant who performed the audit when the company turns out to 
be insolvent and unable to repay the funds. 72 
-A putative beneficiary of a will who is denied a bequest because of 
an error in the drafting or execution of the will sues the attorney who 
prepared the will and supervised its execution.73 
71. See Rabin, supra note 68. 
72. E.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d I 10 (N.Y. 
1985); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 
1988). 
73. E.g., Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289 (Or. 1987); Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 
744 (Pa. 1983); see also Jay M. Feinman, Attorney Liability to Nonc/ients, 30 TORT & 
INS. L.J. (forthcoming 1996). 
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-A home buyer who relies on a termite inspection report ordered by 
the seller sues the inspector when the house turns out to have 
undisclosed termite infestation.74 
-The successor in title to a landowner sues a surveyor75 or title 
abstractor76 whose errors in performing its contract with the original 
landowner caused the successor's interest in the property to be less 
valuable. 
-An employee who was dismissed for failing a drug test sues the 
testing laboratory for negligently administering the test. 77 
-A home buyer who relies on statements concerning the condition of 
the property relayed from the seller through the seller's real estate 
broker sues the broker when the statements are revealed to be 
erroneous. 78 
III. ADVANTAGES OF RECLASSIFICATION 
The conscious definition of a new field of law is an exercise in 
problem-solving designed to facilitate the application of legal principles 
and policies. A group of cases presents issues that cannot be satisfacto-
rily resolved through the existing doctrinal structure. When lawyers and 
judges apply existing rules or principles to address the issues, the results 
appear to be inadequate or inconsistent. These problems ::an be 
solved--or at least lessened--by reconceptualizing the cases at a 
relatively general level; that is, by incorporating them within a new field 
of law or a new doctrinal structure.79 
74. E.g., Allred v. Dobbs, 223 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Barrie v. V.P. 
Extenninators, 625 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1993); see also Jay M. Feinman, Economic 
Negligence in Residential Real Estate Transactions, 25 REAL ESTATE L.J. (forthcoming 
1996). 
75. E.g., Rozny v. Mamul, 250 N.E.2d 656 (Ill. 1969); Cook Consultants v. 
Larson, 700 S. W.2d 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), writ refused nre, (Tex. 1986); see also 
Feinman, supra note 74. 
76. E.g., First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Service Co. of the Florida Keys, 457 
So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1984); Williams v. Polgar, 215 N.W.2d 149 (Mich. 1974); see also 
Feinman, supra note 74. 
77. E.g., Lewis v. Aluminum Co. of America, 588 So. 2d 167 (La. Ct. App.), writ 
denied, 592 So. 2d 411 (La. 1992); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doc, 903 S.W.2d 347 
(Tex. 1995). 
78. E.g., Tennant v. Lawton, 615 P.2d 1305 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); Hagar v. 
Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 Wyo. 1981); see also Feinman, supra note 74. 
79. This experience is much like the situation in Thomas Kuhn's classic 
description of scientific inquiry. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970), and commentary, especially David Hollinger, T.S. Kuhn's 
Theory of Science and its Implications for History, 78 AM. HIST. REV. 370 (1973). 
Scientists proceeding under a prevailing theory may encounter observations or 
experimental results which cannot easily be explained by the theory. One response is 
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The reconceptualization of third-party economic loss cases into the 
field of economic negligence serves this problem-solving purpose by 
facilitating generalization across cases and groups of cases. Generaliza-
tion is the core of the common law process in which lawyers, judges, 
and scholars decide that cases are similar or different in material respects 
and generalize about the similarities and differences. The new doctrinal 
classification makes more readily apparent the ways in which different 
third party cases do or do not resemble each other. This recognition 
leads to the identification of themes, arguments, principles, and 
subclassifications that improve the understanding of the cases. 
This Part suggests some of the different types of generalizations that 
result from the reclassification of economic negligence. 80 Because 
economic negligence is a new field, this is only an exploration. It 
indicates some of the kinds of generalizations that the reclassification 
makes possible, but it does not exhaust the list of possibilities or explore 
all of their applications. 
The first type of generalization consists of certain themes that 
represent the fundamental policies with which the courts grapple in this 
area of law. Second, the themes give rise to broad policy arguments 
about the appropriate treatment of the cases. Third, some factual issues 
recur in the cases, leading to various subclassification of factually similar 
cases arising in different settings. Finally, some principles or rules of 
thumb for the decision of cases arise. 
A. The Central Themes in Economic Negligence 
A few issues or themes recur in the hundreds of economic negligence 
cases that exhibit the characteristics described in Part II. These themes 
provide an important perspective on the historical development of the 
law and on the policy conflicts that arise throughout the cases. The 
three central themes in the law of economic negligence are: 
to maintain the fundamental attributes of the theory and to introduce complexities that 
account for the new evidence, much the way Ptolemaic astronomers introduced the 
concept of epicycles to account for the irregularity of planetary behavior. Ultimately, 
though, the contradictions and inconsistencies accumulate to such an extent that they can 
be resolved only by substituting a new general theory. The new theory not only 
provides an explanation of the data, but it also provides a structure of inquiry for 
scientists working in the field. 
80. See generally Feinman, supra note 68. 
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( 1) The application of fundamental tort policies, which has led to the 
decline of privity as a prerequisite to liability; 
(2) The protection of private ordering through contract; and 
(3) The threat of indeterminate liability. 
Each of these themes is discussed in many cases and figures importantly 
in the selection of liability rules. The themes express the issues that are 
involved in economic negligence cases as they arise in varied fact 
settings, and they provide a basis for constructing arguments that can be 
used to address those issues. The following sections briefly explain 
these three themes. 
I. The Application of Tort Policies 
Courts and legislatures prescribe rules of tort liability to serve certain 
fundamental policies. The most important of the basic tort policies are 
ccmpensating victims of harm, deterring wrongful conduct and providing 
incentives for reasonable conduct, placing losses on those who can best 
bear or distribute them, and faimess---under which is included redressing 
harm caused to innocent parties and imposing the burden of harm on the 
parties responsible for it.81 The first major theme in the law of 
economic negligence is the courts' desire to serve these policies in cases 
of economic injury to third parties. Serving these policies has led to an 
increase in liability to third parties, at the expense of the doctrine of 
privity, and has made apparent the inadequacy of the traditional doctrinal 
classifications in this area. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler stated 
the general proposition that tort policies are of primary importance: 
"[ u ]nless some policy considerations warrant otherwise, privity should 
not be, and is not, a salutary predicate to prevent recovery. Generally, 
within the outer limits fixed by the court as a matter of law, the 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of the negligent act define the duty 
and should be actionable."82 
In other words, the ordinary principles of tort law----here summarized 
as liability for "the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the negligent 
act"--govem; liability is limited to parties in privity only when the court 
determines that those principles dictate that result.83 
81. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 17, § 4. In serving these policies, lawmakers 
also must be concerned with the courts' ability to conveniently and capably administer 
the resulting doctrine. Id. 
82. 461 A.2d 138, 145 (N.J. 1983). 
83. In its opinion, the court further detailed and applied the policies of tort law. 
Id. at 150-52. 
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Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin,84 one of the first cases to expand the 
liability of accountants in negligent misrepresentation beyond privity, 
makes the same point about the application of tort policies and provides 
a convenient summary of those policies. 
Why should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden of 
an accountant's professional malpractice?" fan 't the risk of loss more easily 
distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting profession, which 
can pass the cost of insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in tum 
pass the cost onto the entire consuming public?" Finally, wouldn't a rule of 
foreseeability elevate the cautionary techniques of the accounting profession?" 
For these reasons it appears to this Court that the decision in Ultramares 
constitutes an unwarranted inroad upon the principle that "the risk reasonably 
to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."" 
The balance of factors test for the determination of a negligence duty, 
first adopted in will beneficiary cases and subsequently applied to a 
myriad of third party situations, defines in more detail guidelines for the 
application of the tort policies. 
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable 
to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing 
of various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was 
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame 
attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future 
harm.89 
All of these statements of the doctrine are motivated by a primary 
concern for the application of tort policies to third party situations. The 
courts have attempted to bring economic negligence, or at least some 
parts of it, within the mainstream of tort law. Although liability rules 
and results may differ among economic negligence situations and 
between economic negligence cases and cases of physical injury, the 
thrust of the doctrine is to ensure that the objectives of compensation, 
deterrence, loss distribution, and fairness are served. 
84. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.!. 1968). 
85. This invokes the compensation and fairness policies. 
86. This invokes the loss distribution policy. 
87. This invokes the deterrence policy. 
88. Rusch Factors, Inc., 284 F. Supp. at 91 (quoting Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 
162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)). 
89. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 651, 320 P.2d 16, 19 ( 1958). 
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Courts have recognized that the decline of privity and the application 
of tort policies was a necessary step in economic negligence cases, but 
taking the step presents new problems. The application of tort policies 
threatens to undermine the process of private ordering in many settings 
and to expose parties to the threat of indeterminate liability. Those 
concerns are embodied in the other major themes of economic negli-
gence. 
2. The Protection of Private Ordering 
The second major theme in the law of economic negligence is the 
desire to protect the private ordering process which takes place when 
parties enter into contracts. Every economic negligence case originates 
in a contract entered into by the defendant and its contracting partner. 
In the simplest case, the defendant and its partner have allocated the 
risks and benefits of performance in their contract. The court upsets that 
allocation when it imposes liability on the defendant in favor of a non-
contracting third person. Imposing such liability outside the contract is 
unfair to the defendant, who has ordered its affairs on the expectations 
created in the contract, and undermines the process of contracting. 
Many economic negligence cases involve more elaborate private 
ordering. The defendant and the plaintiff each may enter into a contract 
with the other party, as where an accountant and a lender each contract 
with a company. Or, multiple parties are involved in a set of interlock-
ing relationships created by several contracts. In the classic construction 
project, the owner contracts separately with the architect and the general 
contractor, the general contractor retains subcontractors, the subcontrac-
tors contract with suppliers, and so on, with each contract specifying 
some of the duties owed to one's contracting partner and perhaps to 
other participants in the project as well. In settings such as these, all the 
parties have planned their interlocking relationships, and imposing 
liability beyond the obligations assumed in the contracts disrupts that 
planning.90 
The logic of private ordering is, of course, the logic of contract law: 
Individuals are the best judges of their own interests; contracts provide 
a means through which they can enter into transactions that maximize 
those interests; the expectation and reliance interests created by contracts 
deserve to be protected; promoting private contracting produces a social 
benefit; contract law provides the framework through which the 
individual and social benefits are realized in practice. In economic 
90. See, e.g., Manda! v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 527 P.2d 387,390 (Or. 1974); Blake 
Constr. Co. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724 (Va. 1987). 
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negligence cases, private ordering is furthered by recogmzmg the 
primacy of contract law as the appropriate structure for regulating 
relationships, whereas the application of tort law could upset the parties' 
private ordering. This position is most strongly expressed in the 
economic loss rule, under which contract law is exclusively applied to 
govern economic negligence cases.91 As a result, recovery by a third 
party is allowed only if the third party is able to establish that it is a 
third party beneficiary of the defendant's contract according to traditional 
contract law principles. 
3. The Threat of Indeterminate Liability 
The threat of imposing liability of an uncertain scope on a defendant 
has been one of the central concerns of the law of economic negligence 
since its origins.92 The concern received its authoritative expression in 
Cardozo's maxim in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche: 93 "If liability for 
negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a 
theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose 
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate 
time to an indeterminate class. "94 
The problem of indeterminate liability is not, in essence, a problem of 
magnitude. The damages to which the defendant may be subject in an 
economic loss case may be enormous, just as they can be in a physical 
injury case, but the potential size of the damages raises no problem that 
is distinctive to the economic negligence area. Instead, the problem of 
indeterminacy is a problem of uncertainty caused by the spreading out 
or rippling down of the harm caused by the defendant's negligence. In 
many cases the damages are very large, but it is only because the 
damages also are unpredictable that they are problematic. 
Two types of indeterminacy arise in third party cases: uncertainty as 
to the number of plaintiffs who can bring a claim and uncertainty as to 
91. Product-related economic loss cases applying the economic loss rule provide 
especially rich discussions. See, e.g., East River S.S. Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 
476 U.S. 858 (1986); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. 





See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note 67, at 253-56. 
174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). 
Id. at 444. 
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the size of each claim. These are determined by the related factors of 
the class of plaintiffs who are permitted to recover, the class of 
transactions for which they may recover, and the time in which 
compensable harm may occur. There are many ways of defining these 
factors. For example, the class of plaintiffs could be defined to include 
only those persons who are in actual privity, those who are in a 
relationship of near privity, those whom the defendant knows will rely, 
or those whose reliance is unknown but reasonably foreseeable. 
Similarly, the transactions could be defined to include those for which 
the defendant specifically furnishes its performance, transactions of a 
similar nature, or any foreseeable transaction. The limits of compensable 
harm could be defined to include only harm which results from a 
relatively immediate use of the defendant's performance, or it could 
extend to a use which is many steps removed and years later. Obvious-
ly, as one moves further up each scale, the indeterminacy of the liability 
expands. 
There are two features of economic negligence situations that make the 
threat of indeterminate liability particularly acute. First, the consequenc-
es of a negligent act which causes economic loss can extend very far, 
unlike the consequences of a negligent act causing physical injury. 
Although the consequences of a physical accident can be catastrophic, 
they tend to be limited in space and time to the immediate victims.95 
The economic consequences of a negligent act, on the other hand, can 
extend along chains of causation to many persons far removed in time 
and contact from the defendant. By definition, plaintiffs in third party 
cases are at least one step removed from the defendant, and they are 
often farther removed--the ultimate purchaser of a manufactured 
product, a subsequent purchaser of property that has been negligently 
constructed or surveyed, or the supplier to a subcontractor who relies on 
an architect's specifications. 
Second, many economic negligence cases arise from the making of a 
statement or the communication of information. The rippling of 
consequences is particularly likely to occur with information, which can 
be passed quickly and costlessly from person to person (and often to 
many persons at once) in ways over which the defendant who produced 
the information has no control.96 Once an accountant's audit report is 
95. Economic loss which flows to persons other than the immediate victim of the 
accident, such as the loss suffered by members of the victim's family, do raise 
indeterminacy problems, so they are usually dealt with under special duty rules. See, 
e.g., FOWLER V. HARPER, ET AL., 3 THE LAW OF TORTS§ 18.4 (2d ed. 1986). 
96. There is a further distinctive problem with information in that it is difficult for 
the creator of the information to recapture the benefits of its use by the many parties to 
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issued, it can be disseminated widely and relied on by members of the 
general public.97 
The threat of indeterminate liability is often asserted as an independent 
reason for limiting the scope of liability in economic negligence cases. 
However, indeterminacy is not a concern in and of itself, but because it 
affects the application of the fundamental tort policies and the protection 
of private ordering. 
The defendant is unable to calculate the costs and benefits of its 
behavior when the amount of its potential liability is uncertain, so the 
threat of liability in an indeterminate amount is likely to undermine the 
parties' ability to achieve a contractual allocation of costs and benefits 
and to produce either too little or too much of an incentive for the 
defendant to regulate its conduct. Similarly, when the defendant cannot 
reasonably accurately calculate its potential loss, it cannot either insure 
against the loss or distribute it appropriately to its customers. Moreover, 
in many situations the plaintiff is in a better position to reduce the 
likelihood or extent of the loss because it knows better than the 
defendant the facts relevant to its particular situation that will determine 
the scope of loss. Finally, indeterminate liability can impose an unfair 
burden on the defendant because the defendant is not in a position to 
prevent or prepare for the unknowable loss. 
B. Arguments 
The central themes of economic negligence can be restated to form 
two general arguments about the doctrinal classification and liability 
rules that are appropriate to the cases. Courts and lawyers make these 
arguments in many different kinds of cases. One argument emphasizes 
the contractual origins of the relationships that give rise to the cases and 
asserts that liability on the contract is the exclusive means of recovery; 
this argument is most clearly embodied in the economic loss rule. The 
second argument builds on the extracontractual elements of the parties's 
relationships and stresses responsibilities that arise beyond their 
whom it ultimately may be communicated. See Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 
1564-65 (7th Cir. I 987). 
97. The distinctive character of information cases is a principal reason that the law 
of negligent misrepresentation has featured so prominently in the law of economic 
negligence, as a supplement to or substitute for the general law of negligence. 
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contracts; this argument is more open to the possibility of liability to 
third parties, as third party beneficiaries or in tort. 
1. The Contractual Argument 
The contractual argument is based on a conception of the contracting 
process and of the legal system's relationship to the process.98 Every 
economic negligence case arises from a contractual setting, either a 
simple contract the performance of which affects a third person or a 
network of intertwined contracts that structure a complex interaction 
among multiple parties. The parties allocate the costs, benefits, and risks 
of their interaction through this contracting process. Sometimes the 
allocation is explicit and detailed; at others, it is implicit and by default. 
In every case, however, the parties actually or potentially have control 
of the structure and content of their relationship. 
The law's role in this process is to support the parties' private 
ordering by using contract law to interpret and enforce their contracts. 
In defining obligations and allocating risks and benefits, the parties 
create expectations. The function of the law is to fulfill those expecta-
tions by enforcing the contracts as the parties have made them. It is 
inappropriate for the courts to impose liability outside the contracts, as 
through tort law. Tort law is better suited to the redress of accidental 
physical harm than to the regulation of the kind of consensual economic 
relationships present in most economic negligence cases. When the 
courts impose liability, it upsets the parties' own allocation of rights and 
duties, diminishes their ability to regulate their own affairs, introduces 
inefficiencies into the process, and raises the threat of indeterminate 
liability. 
The contractual argument is made throughout the law of economic 
negligence, but it is particularly well-suited to situations involving 
experienced parties engaged in extensive contracting, as in cases arising 
from the construction industry, sales of product to commercial purchas-
ers, or financial transactions involving sophisticated parties. Although 
the power to engage effectively in private ordering through contract is 
often hypothesized, it is most effectively realized in areas such as these. 
In the construction area, for example, participants typically do use 
extensive contracts to form their relationships. Both at the level of the 
trade groups which promulgate form contracts and the individual 
98. For expressions of this view, see, e.g., United States for the use and benefit of 
Control Systems, Inc. v. Arundel Corp., 896 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Miss. 
law); Floor Craft v. Parma General Hospital, 560 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio l 990); Blake Constr. 
Co. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724 {Va. l 987). 
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transaction for which the parties negotiate a unique contract, serious 
allocation of the costs and benefits of the construction process (including 
the costs and benefits of contracting with respect to risks) characterizes 
the contracting process. 
2. The Relational Argument 
The contractual argument can be insufficiently sensitive to two issues: 
the extent to which the parties' written contracts do not accurately reflect 
the nature of their relationships, and relational characteristics of the 
setting that are either extracontractual or noncontractual. The second 
line of argument responds to these issues by emphasizing relational 
characteristics. 
In an ideal contracting situation, the parties' contracts embody the 
culmination of a planning process in which the parties have specified the 
terms of their performance and the allocation of risks. In many real 
contracting situations, however, unlike the theorized ideal, there are a 
number of factors that indicate that the ideal has been met. A first factor 
is the extent to which the parties have actually specified performance 
terms and allocated risks in their contracts. Often the contract may 
incompletely specify the responsibilities and risks each party has 
assumed. Sometimes the parties adopt a standard form contract when 
one or both of them is not completely aware of its terms. Where parties 
have carefully considered and negotiated the complete performance and 
risk terms of their relationship, the resulting contracts are more likely to 
represent effective planning and a reasonable allocation of responsibili-
ties; where the parties have simply adopted a prevailing form, or when 
one party has imposed the form on another, the planning process is less 
worthy of deference. 
A second factor that can indicate the extent to which the written 
contract represents a real allocation of responsibilities and risks by the 
parties is the extent to which they observe the fruits of their planning in 
actual practice. Where they frequently depart from the strict require-
ments of the contractually-specified performance, actions speak louder 
than words. In such a case, the parties' conduct can provide a guide to 
interpreting the contract or can be an alternative source of relational 
obligation where the conduct is inconsistent with the contract. For 
example, where an architect significantly directs the progress of the work 
even though its contractual obligation to do so is either limited or 
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unclear, and the contractor accepts such supervision, the architect bears 
some responsibility when its direction is in error. By their conduct the 
parties have indicated that norms other than those specified in the 
contract are significant in their relationship, or that the need for 
flexibility in developing their relationship takes precedence over their 
initial planning. 
As this factor suggests, in the relational argument contractual relations 
are seen as composed of extracontractual and noncontractual relations as 
well as contractually-defined obligations. In successful relationships, the 
participants are cooperative and flexible in the face of changes and 
difficulties, and they do not insist on limiting their performance to their 
contractual duties and on their partner's strict performance of their 
contractual rights. Moreover, participating in an intertwined relation 
necessarily creates obligations to other participants. The contractual 
argument rests on a vision of party autonomy and limited obligation; the 
relational argument rests on a vision of connection and responsibility. 
While the contracts are an important source of the definition of the 
parties' obligation, other sources are equally important and often even 
more important. The professional status and superior expertise of a 
party; the implicit understandings, tacit assumptions, and customary 
practices of the trade; the parties' course of dealing in the past and their 
course of performance; the need for trust and cooperation; for example, 
all give rise to expectations about a participant's appropriate role that 
supplement the parties' explicit planning. 
From this expanded perspective, the law's role is not limited to 
enforcement of the express terms of the parties' contracts. The express 
terms must be supplemented by relational factors from the context, 
broadly construed, and by concern for policies not adequately captured 
in the concept of enforcing the parties' contracts. In the relational 
approach, the law has values to serve in addition to effectuating the 
parties' explicit planning-particularly the value ofrelational responsibil-
ity and values expressed in tort policies. Accordingly, tort liability is an 
appropriate supplement to liability on the contract. 
C. Subclassifications of Cases 
A doctrinal structure, like any other taxonomy, is composed of parts 
and subparts. Contract is a basic-level classification, private law is a 
higher-level classification, and unconscionability is a lower-level 
classification. Each classification suggests something about the degree 
of relationship among its constituents, relative to the constituents of 
other categories. All contract cases share features that they generally do 
not share with tort cases; unconscionability cases are distinctive in some 
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ways that render them worthy of treatment apart from other contract 
cases. 
The same kind of subclassification is evident in economic negligence. 
The initial grouping of cases together as belonging to economic 
negligence is based on certain similarities among the cases. Once that 
grouping is accomplished, it also is possible to see similarities and 
differences among smaller sets of the cases. Identifying those similari-
ties and differences can aid in the analysis of particular cases. 
This section suggests some factual distinctions among economic 
negligence cases. The factual distinctions are significant because they 
suggest directions for the analysis of the cases according to the 
categories in which the cases fall. 
1. Extent of Relationship 
One method of categorizing cases across factual settings measures the 
extensiveness of the parties' relationships. There are three such classes 
of cases: 
• The defendant and the second party enter into a contract, the 
performance of which affects the third party (the plaintiff), but the 
second party and the plaintiff have no contractual relationship. An 
example is a will beneficiary case in which the attorney and the client 
enter into a contract to draft a will, but the putative beneficiary has no 
contract with the client. 
When the contract benefits the third party, as in the will beneficiary 
case, the dictates of private ordering and tort policies suggest that the 
defendant owes a duty to the third party. The contracting party's 
objectives can be effectuated only by granting an action to the third 
party since the second party is either unavailable or has little incentive 
to enforce the defendant's duty to perform with reasonable care. 
Likewise, the obligations that attach to the defendant's position affect 
and can be enforced only by the third party. Ordinarily, the defendant 
will be able to anticipate the loss to the third party, so no indeterminacy 
problem arises. 
When the contract creates a relationship which is not primarily 
beneficial to the third party, more careful consideration of the elements 
of the relation is required. A client who retains an attorney for litigation 
is creating a relationship adverse to the third party who is its opponent 
in litigation; it is unlikely in such a case that relational obligations will 
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attach. An attorney-client relationship also may affect third parties who 
are not wholly adverse, such as the children of a divorcing spouse. The 
result in those cases depends on particular elements of the relationship 
and the setting. 
• The defendant and the second party enter into a contract, the 
performance of which affects the third party, and the second party and 
the plaintiff also have a contract, the performance of which does not 
affect the defendant. Some of the elements of a typical real estate 
transaction illustrate: The surveyor and the termite inspector each 
contract with the seller of the property, and the seller contracts with the 
buyer to furnish the survey and the termite report. Another form of case 
in this category is the chain relationship cases, in which the three parties 
are in a vertical relationship with each other, such as a product 
manufacturer, retailer, and ultimate purchaser; or a home builder, initial 
purchaser, and subsequent purchaser. 
The issues in this type of case flow both from the parties' specific act 
of private ordering and from the broader aspects of the relationship in 
which they are situated. The seller contracts with the termite inspector 
to provide a report which is satisfactory to the buyer, so private ordering 
concerns and tort policy concerns suggest that the buyer be able to 
enforce the obligation. In many cases, though, the intention to benefit 
the third party is less explicit and the third party may never directly 
receive the performance; an appraisal report may be delivered solely to 
the lender, not the buyer. Then, the obligation derives, if at all, more 
clearly from the general context, in which the buyer intangibly relies on 
the lender's judgment that the price for the property is appropriate. 
When the relationship becomes too attenuated, however, the concern for 
indeterminate liability comes into play. On the other hand, when the 
case involves only a loss of a known character that will befall either the 
third party or a successor, the loss is not indeterminate in kind. Thus, 
the case for liability is stronger. 
• The defendant, the second party, and the plaintiff have contracts that 
require interlocking performances in a complex relationship, as in a 
typical construction project. 
In this category of cases, relational concerns predominate. The 
parties' specific private ordering through contract is recognized to the 
extent that it represents a real exercise of choice and planning by the 
parties and to the extent that it is complete. In many cases, however, the 
contracts will be formulaic and incomplete, so tort policies are needed 
to supplement the parties' planning. Relational obligations arising from 
custom, tacit understandings, and fairness concerns then supplement or 
even overcome the written contract. As the relations become more 
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encompassing, the threat of indeterminate liability becomes a greater 
concern. 
2. Single Loss Versus Class of Parties 
A second method of grouping cases across factual settings is according 
to the nature of the loss: the number of parties who may potentially 
suffer loss from the defendant's negligent performance and the possible 
extent of that loss. Some cases involve only a single potential loss 
which is predictable in its nature, if not its amount. When a title 
abstracter issues an erroneous title report, or a surveyor performs an 
inaccurate survey, the error may not be discovered until the property has 
been transferred to a subsequent purchaser, even several years after the 
original transaction. Whenever the loss caused by the error is realized, 
however, it will occur only once----to the current owner of the property. 
This kind of loss is also predictable in its nature; it will be limited to the 
value of the property and improvements, although the actual amount of 
the loss will depend on the change in value of the property and the 
extent of improvements. Similarly, when an attorney issues an opinion 
in connection with the sale of a business, only the purchaser or lender 
to whom the opinion is issued suffers the loss, which is limited to the 
value of the business. 
The single loss cases present a particularly strong case for liability. 
Where there is only a single loss, the threat of indeterminacy is 
relatively small. The limit of this principle is reached when the single 
loss occurs long after the defendant's performance, because the 
defendant's ability to anticipate or calculate the liability is diminished. 
A second group of cases includes those cases in which the loss from 
the defendant's negligent performance may be incurred by the members 
of a class of plaintiffs. Here the size of the class and the predictability 
of the size are important. An accountant's audit of the financial 
statements of a limited partnership may be used only by the small group 
of limited partners. Its audit of a large corporation may be used by a 
much larger and less predictable group of investors, lenders, and others. 
Within that group, some plaintiffs will be more predictable than others; 
trade creditors may directly rely on the report, while purchasers of stock 
may rely on it in a much less direct manner. Because of the variation 
in the fact settings, it is difficult to generalize about these cases, 
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although indeterminacy often accompanies an increase in the size of the 
group. 
3. Evaluating Business Services 
There are a number of situations in which one person engages another 
person to provide a professional or expert evaluation of condition, 
quality, or value; a third party relies on the evaluation and suffers a loss 
because it turns out to be incorrect. Most of these cases fall into one of 
five categories: 
(a) actions against pest control services for performing an inadequate 
inspection or control treatment;99 
(b) actions against title abstracters for preparing an erroneous title 
report; 100 
( c) actions against appraisers for a negligently conducted apprais-
al; 101 
( d) actions against engineers for inadequate testing or inspection in 
connection with the construction or purchase of a building; 102 and 
(e) actions against surveyors for surveying a property incorrectly.103 
All of these types of cases can usefully be considered economic 
negligence cases of a certain type: cases involving "evaluative business 
services." 
The paradigmatic evaluative business service case104 contains the 
following elements: 
• The defendant is a licensed professional or an expert. 
• The defendant contracts with a second party to perform an 
evaluation of condition, quality, or value within its area of expertise. 
• The contract is entered into in contemplation of a specific transac-
tion made or to be made between the second party and a person in the 
position of the plaintiff. 
99. E.g., Perschall v. Raney, 484 N.E.2d 1286 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985); Barrie v. V.P. 
Exterminators, Inc., 625 So. 2d I 007 (La. I 993). 
100. E.g., First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Service Co. of the Florida Keys, 457 
So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1984); Williams v. Polgar, 215 N.W.2d 149 (Mich. 1974). 
IOI. E.g., Stotlar v. Hester, 582 P.2d 403 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 585 P.2d 
324 (N.M. 1978); Alva v. Cloninger, 277 S.E.2d 535 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). 
102. E.g., Robert & Co. Assocs. v. Rhodes-Haverty Partnership, 300 S.E.2d 503 
(Ga. I 983); Stanford v. Owens, 265 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 301 N.C. 
95 (1980). 
103. E.g., Kent v. Bartlett, 49 Cal. App. 3d 724, 122 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1975); Rozny 
v. Mamul, 250 N.E.2d 656 (Ill. 1969). 
I 04. On the concept of a paradigm case, see Feinman, supra note I, at 696-705. 
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• The defendant knows or has reason to know that its employment 
relates to the transaction and that the person in the position of the 
plaintiff in that transaction is likely to rely on its evaluation. 
• The defendant improperly performs its evaluation, resulting in an 
erroneous evaluation. 
• The plaintiff learns of the defendant's report of its evaluation from 
the second party in the course of the contemplated transaction, relies on 
it, and suffers economic injury because the evaluation is incorrect. 
In the paradigm case, the defendant is brought into the underlying 
transaction, specifically as an expert, to provide a specialized evaluation 
of the condition, quality, or value of some aspect of the transaction. A 
title abstracter, for example, has distinctive, if not unique, access to 
information concerning the state of the title essential to the transaction. 
The abstracter is brought into the transaction to make use of that access 
to further the objectives of the parties by providing security for the buyer 
concerning the property being conveyed. All of the participants 
understand that the expert's task is to provide an objective evaluation 
according to professional standards, an evaluation providing information 
that will be relied on by its employer and by the third party. The 
parties' assign this role to the expert, and an important element of the 
transaction is the third party's ability to trust the expert's evaluation. 
From the expert's point of view, providing the evaluation for use by its 
employer, the third party, or both, is what it is being paid for. In the 
typical transaction, the abstracter certainly should be aware that the 
abstract will be relied on by someone other than the party who orders it. 
For example, the custom in the locality may be for a seller to order the 
report for use by the buyer, a custom of which the abstracter should be 
aware; in any event, the abstracter certainly should know that a property 
owner seldom orders a title abstract except in contemplation of a sale or 
loan. The risk of loss to the third party should be anticipated by the 
expert, and it is the risk of that loss that the expert is being paid to 
prevent. 
In the transaction, the expert evaluator is the party best situated to deal 
with the potential risk of error. The expert is retained to avoid the risk 
of error that the other, nonexpert participants in the transaction might 
otherwise commit. The only means the nonprivity participant has to 
avoid the risk of error by the defendant is to retain a second expert to 
perform the same evaluation, a step that would produce obvious 
inefficiencies. Moreover, the cost of the error can be more readily 
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allocated to the expert's line of business than to the other parties in the 
transaction. In the case of a title examination, for example, the cost of 
an erroneous report more reasonably can be borne and spread by the 
abstracter in the business of conducting examinations than by the other 
parties---the occasional buyer and seller of a house. 
In a practical sense, a defendant such as an abstracter provides a 
service for the transaction, not only for the party who hires it. The 
defendant is compensated for this service, and it matters little whether 
the compensation comes directly from the user of the service or 
indirectly as one of the transaction costs which must be borne by and 
allocated among the parties. The compensation in effect covers two 
elements: the cost of providing the service with reasonable care, and the 
risk that the abstractor will have to pay for failing to perform with 
reasonable care. Only the second element is potentially greater when 
liability is extended to a third party. 
In fact, however, the abstracter's risk is increased little by the 
extension of liability. The paradigm evaluative service case presents a 
particularly strong argument for liability because of the absence of the 
problem of indeterminate liability. The harm that occurs from a 
defective evaluation occurs only once, to a single party, so there is no 
concern with an indeterminate number of plaintiffs. An inadequate 
survey, termite report, or appraisal will affect only the current owner of 
the property, whether that owner is the party in privity with the expert 
or a third party. Similarly, an incorrect subsurface report will affect only 
the contractor who relies on it. Moreover, the damages that will flow 
from the negligent report in each case are relatively determinate: the 
cost to repair termite damage, the diminished value of the property, or 
the additional cost of constructing the building, and each are the obvious 
consequence of the defendant's error. Only when there are significant 
consequential damages does the indeterminate damages problem arise, 
and in those cases the unpredictability of damages does not differ much 
from the ordinary tort case. Accordingly, liability is appropriately 
imposed in the paradigm evaluative business services case. 
4. Rules of Thumb 
A judge or attorney analyzing an economic negligence case must 
employ the full range of decisional techniques available, but the 
classification of economic negligence as a field of law provides a 
number of helpful guidelines. These "rules of thumb" arise from 
consideration of cases of different types across the range of economic 
negligence. These are not legal rules, or even principles of general 
application; rather, they are tendencies that emerge from analysis of a 
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large number of different settings. The rules of thumb can be used as 
guidelines for an intermediate stage of analysis, but they do not obviate 
a full analysis. Indeed, some of the rules of thumb lead in opposite 
directions in particular cases. 
One group of rules speaks to the status of the parties. 
• Where there is a significant disparity of knowledge, status, or power 
between participants in a relation, the dominant party should take 
account of the interests of the subordinate party. 
• In particular, professionals should adhere to the higher requirements 
of their professional role. Their highest duty is to their clients, but their 
status creates duties toward nonclients as well. 
• Where an actor in a relation engages in activity which is specifically 
directed at another participant or is intended or is likely to affect the 
other participant's interests in a particular or distinctive way, the actor 
has a special responsibility toward the other participant. 
• Where it is difficult for the actor to be compensated for the benefit 
of the service it provides or to be compensated for the risk of liability 
that may result from harm that occurs in the rendition of the service, the 
lack of reciprocity suggests that the obligation ought to be less. This is 
more often the case with the provision of information for which it is 
hard to capture the benefit, or with the provision of a benefit to a large 
or indeterminate group. 
A second group of rules speaks to the balance between planning and 
flexibility in the relationships from which economic negligence cases 
arise. 
• Where there has been a considered application of planning by all 
parties involved which is intended to govern the subject matter of the 
dispute, the planning is entitled to considerable weight. 
• Where the planning process is limited or deficient in some respect, 
it is entitled to less weight. Common limitations and deficiencies 
include the use of a form contract the terms of which are not subject to 
negotiation or are not likely to be considered by one party, a failure to 
consider specific applications of a general provision of a contract, and 
a significant inconsistency between the terms of a document and the 
parties' actions to execute the planning contemplated in the document. 
• In relations of greater complexity or longer duration, or when 
conditions have changed or unanticipated circumstances have arisen, 
flexibility is very important and informal, ongoing planning is important, 
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but formal planning, especially formal planning at the beginning of the 
relationship, is less important. 
In a sense, these rules of thumb (and others that could be devised) 
more closely resemble what are ordinarily thought of as legal principles 
than do the kinds of themes, arguments, and factual subclassifications 
that were described previously. Nevertheless, while their form is 
familiar they are not more useful-and perhaps less useful-in the 
analysis and decision of cases than are the other sorts of description. 
The emphasis on classification in this Article suggests that these other, 
more factually-oriented concepts may be more useful in legal-problem 
solving than are rules of thumb that resemble black-letter law. 
CONCLUSION 
Roscoe Pound, who wrote one of the most important works on the 
classification of legal doctrine,105 cautioned that "we must renounce 
extravagant expectations as to what may be accomplished through 
classification of law."106 Even more than in Pound's era, modem 
lawyers and legal scholars understand that classification can be 
misleading and that the determination of legal results ultimately rests on 
judgment, not classification. Nevertheless, doctrinal classification is a 
central activity of the law. This Article concludes that legal argument, 
analysis, and decision can be improved by reformulating the current 
classification of contract and tort law to recognize economic negligence 
as a new field of law. 
105. Roscoe Pound, Classification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 933, 944 (1924) 
( emphasis omitted). 
106. Id. at 938. 
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